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ABSTRACT
Studying the nexus of media and social movements is a growing
subﬁeld in both media and social movement studies. Although there
is an increasing number of studies that criticize the overemphasis of
the importance of media technologies for social movements, ques-
tions of non-use, technology push-back and media refusal as explicit
political practice have received comparatively little attention. The
article charts a typology of digital disconnection as political practice
and site of struggle bringing emerging literatures on disconnection,
i.e. forms of media technology non-use to the ﬁeld of social move-
ment studies and studies of civic engagement. Based on a theoretical
matrix combining questions of power, collectivity and temporality,
we distinguish between digital disconnection as repression, digital
disconnection as resistance and digital disconnection as performance
and life-style politics. The article discusses the three types of digital
disconnection using current examples of protest and social move-
ments that engage with practices of disconnection.
Abbreviations: AFA: Anti-Fascist Action; CHRI: Center for Human
Rights in Iran; DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service
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Sociologists of speed, such as Wajcman (2015) and Rosa (2013), emphasize that
societies have been speeding up on diﬀerent levels, ranging from the individual experi-
ence of hurried lives to the increased pace of social change and technological innova-
tion. In this context, there have emerged both a trend towards practices of slowing
down and a theoretical engagement with questions of disconnection from accelerated
capitalism carving out alternative spaces and new forms of political engagement.
Particularly, discussions of disconnection in the digital age are thriving to explain
forms of resistance and push-backs against fast-paced, always-on digital societies (for
an overview see Hesselberth, 2018). These studies suggest that disconnection can be
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conceptualized as tactics to navigate the current and increasingly complex digital media
ecology (Light, 2014), as discourses or gestures towards disconnectivity that reinforce
ideas of connectivity rather than providing alternatives (Hesselberth, 2018), or as a form
of resistance against the temporality of fast capitalism (Barranquero, 2013; Pink, 2008).
Especially the latter way of discussing disconnection as a form of resistance implicates
that we should consider the politics of disconnection and hence why and how it matters
for social movements.
Though the ﬁeld of disconnection studies is ﬂuid and constantly extended including
studies on emerging industries capitalizing on the need to disconnect for health reasons
(Fish, 2017; Kuntsman & Miyake, 2017; Sutton, 2017), there is currently no systematic
conceptualization of the implications of disconnection for political practices and social
movements. There are, however, important exceptions, including Portwood-Stacer’s
(2013) discussion of non-use of Facebook as an expression of lifestyle politics, and
Casemajor et al.’s (2015) theoretical conceptualization of non-participation and the
analysis of abstinence across diﬀerent contexts including abstinence from technology
use (Mullaney, 2006). Disconnection as a form of political practice is however nothing
new. There have been earlier, pre-digital forms of mobilization to disconnect. Drotner
(1999) discusses moral panics connected to new formats or media technologies. She
reﬂects for example on mobilizations against vulgar literature in Britain of the 18th
century. Similarly, ﬁlm was perceived as a vulgar intruder and contaminator of the public
sphere and diﬀerent philanthropic groups started to campaign against further diﬀusion of
cinema (Drotner, 1999). Syvertsen (2017) reviews media refusal since the inception of
modern mass media in the late 19th century until digital media today. Hence, rather than
emphasizing the newness of push-back and media refusal as activism, we consider non-
use and disconnection as pre-dating the digital age. This article extends these ongoing
discussions by bringing studies of disconnection to the ﬁeld of social movement studies to
examine the implications and politics of disconnection for social movements with the aim
of building a typology of disconnection as political practice.
There is a pressing need to establish a connection between these traditions, especially
considering that contemporary research on digital activism has disproportionately
centered on hyper-connected movements and their multiple uses of digital technolo-
gies. In general, current literature focusing on the dynamics between social movements
and digital media has been concerned in explaining how activists are using digital
media (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Earl & Kimport, 2011), while almost no attention
has been devoted to scrutinizing how contemporary activists are deliberately choosing
to disconnect from certain platforms, forging alternatives to the imperative of ubiqui-
tous connectivity. The neglect of disconnection and non-participation in contemporary
networked activism has had two main implications (Casemajor, Couture, Delﬁn,
Goerzen, & Delfanti, 2015). First, it has drawn the attention of scholars to exploring
more speciﬁcally the practices of social movements that are actively using digital
technologies, neglecting contemporary movements that are less connected and less
technologically innovative (but not necessarily less relevant). Second, many scholars
have tended to take for granted the digital connectedness of contemporary movements,
adopting new methodologies that rely on harvesting massive quantities of data from
social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. However, as Croeser and Highﬁeld
(2015) have shown, one of the weaknesses of this kind of methodologies is that it
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obscures the negotiations and the tactical avoidance of social media by activists. In
other words, studies on social movements and the media tend to focus on examining
the digital traces and the patterns of those who are connected, but cannot tell us much
on the choices, negotiations and tactics of those who decide to avoid, refuse and
withdraw from digital connection.
The article – conceptual in its outline – provides an overview of current studies of
disconnection, media refusal, push-back activism and media non-use. It brings these
literatures in conversation with insights from social movements studies to discuss the
political potential and consequences of digital disconnection and activism. More spe-
ciﬁcally, we develop a three-dimensional matrix of political practices including power,
level of collectivity and temporality. Based on the matrix, we discuss three types of
digital disconnection as political practice; namely disconnection as repression, discon-
nection as resistance and disconnection as lifestyle politics. We focus on digital dis-
connection that includes the refusal of social media, but moves beyond this side of
media rejection to also include other digital platforms, tools and services. The article
illustrates the three types with current empirical examples and conclude with
a discussion of the relevance of disconnection and activism in the current digital
media ecology and in the context of a dominant focus on hyper-connected social
movements. In that context, it casts digital disconnection as a site of struggle, where
resistance to connection is considered both as a political tactic by activists and their
adversaries, as well as the goal around which activists and their adversaries organize and
campaign.
Disconnection studies
While the ﬁeld of non-usage research is still relatively nascent, there is a growing
number of projects investigating speciﬁc aspects of disconnecting from media technol-
ogies. Within this emerging ﬁeld of disconnection studies, several related terms are
currently used to describe similar though slightly diﬀerent practices. Hesselberth (2018)
suggests distinguishing between technology non-use, media resistance and media dis-
ruption. Media non-use is more closely related to the ﬁeld of audience and reception
studies and emerged in the context of studying media technology use (Hesselberth,
2018). Media non-use describes ‘individuals who intentionally and signiﬁcantly limit
their media use’ (Woodstock, 2014, p. 1983). While media refusal, media resistance and
push-back in contrast include ‘negative actions and attitudes towards media [and]
describe[s] a refusal to accept the way media operate and evolve’ (Syvertsen, 2017,
p. 9). This form of refusal has collective components and goes beyond media non-use
on the individual level. Media disruption discourses focus in contrast on strategies to
shake-up hegemonic conceptualizations of media ecologies (Hesselberth, 2018).
Previous research can furthermore be divided in two major categories based on the
degree of agency that actors encompass. The ﬁrst category of research focuses on
involuntary non-usage, i.e. cases when individuals may want to use a technology but
out of social, economic or infrastructural reasons are excluded from access, for example
research on digital divide (Selwyn, 2003). Here attention is drawn to broader social,
cultural, historical, and political aspects of technology non-use, especially outside of the
North American and European contexts. Another way to examine involuntary non-
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usage is to highlight the relationship between individual agency and power structures
within society. In particular governmental and corporate interests that in many aspects
determine the degree of use and non-use are examined. Non-use of technology may
simply be impossible due to the transition into a technology-based society. For instance,
Ribak and Rosenthal (2015) consider smartphone resistance as an ongoing struggle
between commercial strategies and resistance tactics, asking how long it is possible to
resist considering the pressure to be available to the state and to the market. Hence,
Ribak and Rosenthal engage with non-use stressing the ambivalence of voluntary and
involuntary aspects of the possibility to choose to not use a certain technology.
The second category examines non-usage as a voluntary or intended avoidance of
technology. Individual agency is thus emphasized. In the context of addiction, for example,
worries about overuse are at the forefront. Media refusal becomes the ability to resist the
temptation of using technology and regain self-control. Media resistancemight also be seen
as a deliberate political act, for example when non-use of social media manifests a form of
political asceticism against the all-encompassing dominance of network culture (Karppi,
2011).Mejias (2013) engages inOﬀ the Networkwith strategies of disrupting the dominance
of the idea of networked societies. The reasons for and practices of media resistance are
manifold and deeply ingrained with everyday life (Woodstock, 2014). In contrast,
Portwood-Stacer (2013) discusses the political practice of leaving Facebook while
Brubaker, Ananny, andCrawford (2016) analyze the experience and personal consequences
of suspending Grindr accounts – a popular dating platform. Considering disconnection
with social networking sites (SNS), Light (2014) slightly changes the angle and asks how
forms of disconnection and non-use sustain the overall presence in and of commercial
social media on the micro level. Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre, and Shehata (2013) focus instead
exclusively on the non-usage of certain content, namely news content by speciﬁc social
groups. Syvertsen (2017) discusses similar practices of media refusal, skepticism, abstention
and resistance, while providing a historical contextualization of media resistance as an
everyday phenomenon (for a distinction between media resisters and media rejectors see
Wyatt, Graham, & Terranova, 2002). Sutton (2017) and Fish (2017) examine disconnection
in the form of digital detox camps advocating digital health and digital fasting to counter
the perils of the fast paced always-on digital economy.
Another stream of studies engaging with voluntary disconnection considers forms of
‘old’ media usage. Skågeby (2011) for example explores fast and slow music formats
comparing tape cassettes with playlists. Thorén and Kitzmann (2015) study forms of
non-use and technology resistance by considering vintage and software instruments
users in comparison. Both studies emphasize nostalgic aspects that are connected with
the decision to reject certain technological innovations. Providing an extended reading
of disconnection studies, Hesselberth (2018) identiﬁes problems both in commercial
and academic discourses on disconnectivity. They reinforce the hegemony of being
connected in information-based capitalism rather than establish fundamental alterna-
tives, which she calls structuring paradox of discourses on disconnectivity.
A slightly diﬀerent stream of research within media studies is inspired by design and
media/technology theory. These studies show a growing interest in technological dis-
connect in form of glitches and technological failure that make certain media regimes
visible (Krapp, 2011). Looking at technological glitches is here presented as an inspira-
tion to imagine alternative designs and artistic expressions that allow for creative
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innovation within the digital cultural industry. Taking glitch and failure as a starting
point, Sundén (2016) develops a posthumanist vision of feminism as a set of technol-
ogies that are always already broken, incomplete and bound to failure. She argues that
disconnection and glitch make the underlying and hidden machines that sustain our
social relationships as well as categories visible.
These earlier approaches to disconnection share that they focus exclusively on
practices of disconnection while dismissing other potentially interrelated practices. In
contrast, we bring the literatures on disconnection in conversation with social move-
ment studies to consider non-use in the context of other media and non-media related
political practices (Treré, 2018). Hence, earlier studies of disconnection and media
refusal advocate an understanding and perspective on media that is media-centric
and can be compared to media activism that has media as an object to be revolutionized
or reformed (e.g. the media reform movement, see for example Pickard, 2014). We
suggest considering disconnection also in a non-media centric way, namely in relation
to other political practices and in a non-single media manner (see for a critical discus-
sion Treré, 2018). The typology developed here considers digital disconnection as part
of activism that strategically employs and rejects media to further their political causes
that might but not necessarily relate to media as objects.
Three-dimensional matrix of social movement studies
The following three-dimensional matrix summarizes central categories of social move-
ment studies that have shaped the understanding of how social movements emerge and
evolve over time (see Figure 1). The matrix is used later on to situate digital disconnec-
tion within social movements as political practice.
Power relations and social movements
One central aspect in the study of social movements is the question of power.
Discussions have focused on power relations within social movements as well as in
Power from above
slow
individual collective
fast
Power from below
Figure 1. Three-dimensional matrix of social movement studies.
SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES 5
relation to other social and political institutions that might be addressed as part of the
political struggle movements engage in. In terms of power relations within social
movements, studies have focused on the role and emergence of hierarchies particularly
when it comes to decision-making processes (Tarrow, 2011).
In general, social movements are considered as drivers of social change from below
that are addressing political elites and authorities exercising political power in society.
Sidney Tarrow argues that contentious politics emerge ‘when collective actors join
forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims
or the claims of those they claim to represent’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 4). The potential for
contentious politics evolves in relation to political opportunities that might foster
or hinder the mobilisation of actions of people that are otherwise rather limited in
their power. He argues ‘when their actions are based on dense social networks and
eﬀective connective structures and draw on legitimate, action-oriented cultural frames,
they can sustain actions even in contact with powerful opponents. in such cases – and
only in such cases – we can speak of the presence of a social movement’ (Tarrow, 2011,
p. 16). For the mobilization of individuals to contribute to collective action is largely
based on shared beliefs and identiﬁcation as well as social networks that foster con-
nective structures and suggest suitable forms of political action.
The question of power relations in and of social movements is hence crucially
concerned with the question of agency (Treré, 2016). Power can be either exercises
from above, e.g. by state bodies and institutions or from below, e.g. by individuals or
social movements as grassroots organization that have to achieve political power
through contentious politics. The question where power is situated and exercised is
also crucial for disconnection as a form of political practice.
Collective versus individual aspects of social movements
Beyond the question of power, social movement studies have engaged with questions of
individual versus collective aspects of political participation. Earlier approaches emphasizing
rational choices to commit to collective causes have asked for the motivation of individual
activists to contribute to collective action while risking prosecution and violence (free rider
problem). This focus shifted in the 1970s and 1980s towards the question resource of social
movements for mobilization. More particularly social movement scholars engaged with the
question of how movements mobilize individuals to participate and which organizational
forms allow for successful mobilization. This includes both human and social resources
implying a broad understanding of resources referring to land, work and capital but also
authority, social status and personal initiative (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991).
Over the time, these approaches were extended with cultural aspects of processes of
identiﬁcation and collective identity. Particularly symbolic expression became important to
explain collective process of political participation. With the emergence of digital media,
the ﬁeld was extended with explorations of how collectivities are organized and mobilized
through new media platforms (Treré, 2015; Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, & Reiter, 2006;
Gerbaudo, 2012; Kavada, 2015; Mercea, 2012; Uldam, 2010). These studies engaged with
the question of how the collective agency of social movements, such as the global justice
movement, environmental activism, or anti-austerity protests, has been enabled and
reinforced through new media and the practices of collective identiﬁcation they allow for.
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Treré (2015), for example, engages with hashtags and viral images as expressions of
collective identiﬁcation with political causes and organizations in the context of digital
media. ‘Social media, as a language and a terrain of identiﬁcation’, Gerbaudo argues,
‘becomes a source of coherence as shared symbols, a centripetal focus of attention, which
participants can turn to when looking for other people in the movement’ (2013, p. 266).
However, particularly social media have been equalized with growing individualiza-
tion of media practices and hence emphasizing the individual rather than collectives.
Hartley’s concept of ‘do-it-yourself citizenship’ (2010), for example, emphasizes televi-
sion viewers’ agency. Such forms of political agency, van Zoonen, Visa, and Mihelja
(2010) argue are forms of ‘unlocated citizenship’, namely of citizenship not necessarily
linked to established political institutions. Social media can form the space where such
citizenship is fostered, in ways that are ‘self-actualizing’ rather than ‘dutiful’ (Bennett,
Wells, & Rank, 2009). A major characteristic of such forms of action, according to
Bennett is the emergence of the individual as an important catalyst of collective action
through the mobilization of her social networks, itself enabled through the use of social
media (Bennett, 2012, p. 22). Such networked action is an expression of ‘personalized
politics’, as it is conducted across personal action frames, which embrace diversity and
inclusion, lower the barriers of identiﬁcation with the cause, and validate personal
emotion (Bennett, 2012, pp. 22–23). In this context, ‘connective action’ is substituting
‘collective action’ in the public space (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).
Temporality of social movements
Tarrow (2011) has famously conceptualized protest cycles or cycles of contention that follow
diﬀerent intensities of mobilization and organization over time. These cycles and varying
intensities of social movements are closely linked to the political opportunity structure.
Besides periods of intense activism, there are phases of latency. Periods of slow development
and latency are similarly crucial parts of social movements as high-paced periods of intense
mobilization and rapid change. However, Tarrow’s concept of protest cycles assumes a linear
temporal development of social movements. In contrast, ethnographic and phenomenologi-
cal accounts often emphasize themulti-layered character of temporalities of civic engagement
(Keightley, 2013). Postill (2013), for example, develops a theory of multiple temporal layers of
protest, which goes in hand with the very diverse media technologies used in the organiza-
tional process. He relies on Sewell’s conceptualization of historical sequences as temporally
multi-layered social processes (for an overview on this approach also see Kaun, 2016).
Consequently, he develops events, trends and routines as important categories that constitute
a heterogeneity of protest time. While events refer to concentrated sequences of action that
transform social structures; trends are less concentrated, but rather directional changes in
social relations. Lastly routines are more or less stable schemata that reproduce social
structures. Postill shows in his analysis of the Indignados movement in Spain that protests
are made up of countless timelines that run parallel to each other. Similarly, Veronica Barassi
(2015) considers themultiplicity of protest time. In contrast to Postill, however, she concludes
that even if protests are temporally multi-layered, activists always have to relate to
a hegemonic perception of time. In information based, communicative capitalism this
hegemonic perception of time is connected with speed, presentness and immediacy. The
temporality of media practices that activists are navigating is essential not only for the
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possibility of protest, but also for the possibility of critique that is put forward by the
protesters. Protest marks an accelerated temporality that is preceded by tedious preparations
and organization for the activists. Protest in form of marches or protest camps establishes
a new kind of temporality for those directly involved and those aﬀected in their daily routines
and ﬂows (Kaun, 2016). Hence protesters are acting within a protest time that is related to
a more general regime of temporality, or as Barassi (2015) calls it, hegemonic perception of
time. Mattoni and Treré (2014) conceptualize the role of time for social movements around
micro, meso and macro scales: on the micro level, they identify punctuated events that
potentially transform the movement. The meso level temporality relates to cycles, tides and
waves of mobilization that go beyond single events, but can be considered as concluded
sequences. The macro level temporality concerns epochs of mobilization that are connected
to a certain set or templates for mobilization and that are shared, for instance, within
a generation of social movements. For the current typology, rather than being concerned
with overall cycles of social movements, we focus on questions of temporality on the micro
level concerning the particular speed – fast versus slow – that the speciﬁc practice of digital
disconnection entails.
Types of political disconnection from digital technologies
Drawing on the three-dimensional matrix conceptualizing political activism and social
movements, we develop a typology of disconnection or push-back activism. The three
proposed types – digital disconnection as repression, digital disconnection as resistance
and digital disconnection as performance – are characterized by speciﬁc conﬁgurations
of the categories discussed above, namely power relations, temporality and level of
collectivity (see Table 1). We exemplify the suggested types with a number of current
examples of disconnection activism.
Digital disconnection as repression
Digital disconnection as repression is characterized by power from above, fast pace and
a high level of collectivity. Power from above refers to the level of implementing
disconnection, namely by states or elites in relation to populations that do not have
Table 1. Overview of types of disconnection activism.
Type Characteristics Examples
Disconnection as
repression
power from above, fast pace,
a high level of collectivity
Egyptian kill switch;
German linksunten shutdown; Mexican website 1dmx.org
shutdown
Disconnection as
resistance
a) from below, fast pace,
individual (or small
networks)
b) from below, fast pace,
individual
c) from below, relatively slow,
collective
a) Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
b) data obfuscation (FaceCloak, TrackMeNot)
c) Online non-participation of radical left groups; Dark web
social networking sites; Anonymous
Disconnection as
lifestyle politics
a) from below, fast pace,
highly individualized
b) from above, slow,
individualized
a) Quit Facebook Day, Facebook suicide machine, digital detox
(Camp Grounded, Villa Insight), Slow media manifesto; Data
Detox Programme (Tactical Technology Collective)
b) Policy against digital communication after working hours
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similar access to force. The actions are implemented relatively fast and can be adjusted
to changing contexts quickly. The disconnection practices have consequences on
a collective level and address larger groups rather than individuals while potentially
triggering collective reactions (contentious politics).
Howard et al. distinguish between diﬀerent forms of shutdown practices. Firstly, they
suggest there are complete network shutdowns causing a complete telecommunication
blackout. Secondly, there speciﬁc site-oriented shutdowns addressing particular web-
sites that have been identiﬁed as problematic. Thirdly, they suggest shutdowns take the
shape of disconnecting speciﬁc individual users that have acquired a powerful role as
node within a network. Lastly, shutdowns are exercised by proxy through internet
service providers. As an example of the ﬁrst form of shutdown, Gerbaudo (2013)
discusses the consequences of the total telecommunication blackout enforced by the
Mubarak regime that was implemented in response to growing protest in the country.
On 28 January 2011, the government blocked all internet access and only one ISP
serving the stock exchange remained in place. Similarly, the Iranian government has
recently been blocking internet access on mobile devices in response to growing
protests against economic instability of the country. The shutdown of mobile internet
occurred starting 30 December 2017 and included particularly the blocking of
Instagram and Telegram (Center for Human Rights in Iran, 2018; Rao, 2018).
However, not only these applications were blocked, but access to internet on mobile
devices was slowed down considerably and completely cut oﬀ for at least half an hour
according to the Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI). Besides employing methods
of partial and complete shutdowns in Iran, governments in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Kashmir and Gabon have recently taken to similar measures to disrupt emer-
ging political opposition and pulling the kill switch has been identiﬁed as growing and
worrying trend on an international scale by commentators (Koebler, 2016; Neal, 2013).
An example for site-speciﬁc shutdown is the ban and raid of the Indymedia subsite
linksunten in Germany. Identifying the site as being in conﬂict with German laws and
‘sowing hate against diﬀerent opinions and representatives of the country’ the site was
shut down in August 2017 by the Interior Ministry (Welle, 2017). Part of the justiﬁca-
tion of banning linksunten Indymedia was its classiﬁcation as a political club rather
than a media site, which reﬂects promises of cracking down on left-wing extremist
groups by politicians in the aftermath of the G20 protests in Hamburg just seven weeks
before.
These forms of disconnection take diﬀerent shapes – on the one hand shutdown and
on the other hand censorship – but share that they can lead to contentious politics and
collective actions counter to the intentions of the political elites that were implementing
them. For instance, Gerbaudo (2013), shows how the kill switch turned into a suicide
switch by alienating the internet-savvy middle class and making face-to-face meet ups
necessary. Consequently, the blackout eﬀectively drew people to Tahrir square instead
from keeping them oﬀ the streets. This powerful reaction of Egyptian citizens to the
digital blackout displays the ongoing signiﬁcance of physical relationships within social
movements, and strongly counteracts the image of contemporary activism as being
increasingly relegated to an immaterial virtual sphere. The kill switch backlashed
precisely because Egyptian authorities overestimated the revolutionary power of digital
technologies for collective action in the short term, while at the same time
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underestimating the capacity of the people to concomitantly rely on oﬄine connections
and physical ties, and their will to take to the streets and the squares. Furthermore, as
Gerbaudo shows, the sudden absence of any digital and mobile connection made
activists aware of how much they were relying on networked media to carry out their
protest actions, often in an excessive way. Thus, this digital deprivation had paradoxi-
cally the eﬀect of making them focus on their more pressing daily needs, to regain
a deeper sense of locality, and to concentrate their energy in the organization and
coordination of the street protests in the hic et nunc. As Gerbaudo remarks,
The kill switch facilitated the development of a thick face-to-face experience that was
crucial in sustaining collective action for several days in Tahrir Square and central Cairo,
in which it did not seem to matter too much to people that they did not have internet
connection or working mobile phones (2013, p. 38).
This example clearly illustrates that disconnection as repression may engender unex-
pected practices of resistance that heavily exploit non-digital communications: shutting
down the online realm can thus stimulate oﬄine connections and protest. Other
examples of disconnection as repression include the removal of websites and social
media platforms that have particular relevance for activists. For instance, the Mexican
website 1dmx.org was set up in the wake of a set of controversial protests held on
1 December 2012, against the inauguration of the new – now former – President of
Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto. For one year, the site served as a source of information,
discussion and commentary from the point of view of the protesters. In particular, it
included pictures, videos and testimony created by activists that documented the abuses
committed by the police, and tried to counteract the oﬃcial institutional narrative that
was reassuring Mexican citizens that everything was going smoothly. As the anniversary
of the protests approached, the site grew to include organized campaigns against
proposed laws to criminalize protest in the country, as well as preparations to document
the results of a memorial protest that was planned for 1 December 2013. On
December 2nd, 2013, the site disappeared from the internet, since the United States
host, GoDaddy (one of the largest companies in the world for providing online
domains) suddenly suspended the domain without giving prior notice. The company
told its owners that the site was taken down ‘as part of an ongoing law enforcement
investigation’. The oﬃce in charge of this investigation was listed as ‘Special Agent
Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City’ (the contact email
pointed to ‘ice.dhs.gov’, implying that this agent was working as part of the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement wing, who have been involved in domain
name takedowns in the past). Following the legal pressures of the 1DMX website
team that spurred an investigation, a complex intrigue emerged, showing that the
United States Embassy in Mexico was used as a mere facade for the Mexican
Government that in the end was the one responsible for the website takedown. While
the website was eventually reactivated, its sudden removal had profound consequences
on Mexican activist practices. Their energies had to be rechanneled on creating a mirror
website, and on ﬁnding ways to regain possession over the obscured platform, by means
of complex legal procedures (the Mexican legal system is renowned for its intricacy)
and by publicly denouncing the dramatic takedown on social media, alternative media
and newspapers. Thus, this act of digital removal perpetrated by the government heavily
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destabilized the consolidated routine of Mexican activism, and jeopardized the organi-
zation of future protests and mobilizations.
In line with the previous example, Uldam (2016) has explored ‘silencing’, e.g. the
taking down of critical and opposing websites or social media accounts as one strategy
by corporations in the oil industry – more speciﬁcally BP and Shell – to manage
mediated visibility. In that case, the power to disconnect is also exercised from above,
however, not by the state but by corporate elites. However, as the Mexican 1DMX
example illustrates, sometimes silencing of political antagonists can be more eﬀectively
achieved by a dangerous amalgamation of tech companies and governments.
Digital disconnection as resistance
Digital disconnection as resistance concerns practices of refusal to comply with speciﬁc
political contexts and developments that are implemented by actors that are not part of
the political elite and belong to grassroots organization. They share the temporality of
relative slowness as disconnection as resistance concerns practices that are constantly
negotiated depending on the technological development and political context. In that,
they are never stable or ﬁnalized. We distinguish however between on the one hand
practices of disconnection as resistance on an individual level, and on the other hand
practices of disconnection as resistance on a collective level. Disconnection that is
subsumed in this section concerns the use of tactics that force adversaries to disconnect,
along with the (almost) completely eschewing of digital media and the partial discon-
nection from speciﬁc platforms as forms of political resistance.
In the previous section we analyzed how disconnection can be enforced from above
as a form of repression, cyber-attacks such as the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
show that forcible disconnection can also acquire the shape of an activist tactic. This
tactic is employed by activists to target political adversaries seeking to make an online
service unavailable to its intended users by disrupting services of a host connected to
the internet, usually overwhelming it with traﬃc from multiple sources. A DDoS can
cause the network to slow down, speciﬁc websites to be inaccessible, as well as the
disconnection of a wireless or wired internet connection. This kind of attacks have been
used both against symbols of neoliberal oppression such as corporate and multinational
banks’ websites, as well as against independent media sites like PopVote in the 2014
Hong Kong protests (Olson, 2014). These forms of forced disconnection as activist
tactic are fast paced and conducted by individuals or smaller networks of actors.
An example of disconnection as resistance against the commercial use of data
produced in social media platforms (from below, slow and individualized) is data
obfuscation. Brunton and Nissenbaum (2011, 2015)) for instance have identiﬁed dif-
ferent forms of obfuscation as strategies to resist ubiquitous surveillance and data
extraction in the network ecology. They argue that almost any form of mundane
contact with digital media involves involuntary data extraction. In that context, they
identify emerging forms of resistance through obfuscating data trace that are left while
using digital media. Further, they present FaceCloak and TrackMeNot browser plugins
as two examples that help users managing their data traces in social media or while
surﬁng the internet more generally. FaceCloak provides you with the possibility to
choose between keeping your information private through encryption and storage on
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a separate server or sharing them openly with Facebook. Additionally, FaceCloak
generates fake information Facebook requires from you for your proﬁle. In contrast
TrackMeNot obfuscates web searches by adding ghost searches to your ‘real inquiries’.
The plugin makes it harder for search engines to identify search patterns that are
relevant for third parties (Brunton & Nissenbaum, 2011). In terms of temporality, these
practices do not necessarily emphasize or foster slowness. Quite the opposite, they seem
to promote faster online experiences by eliminating unnecessary noise, often in form of
advertisement. However, the solutions are rather short-term as commercial platforms
often quickly stop applications that run counter to their established business model of
valorizing data traces. Hence, the applications have to be constantly adapted and
changed. These forms of data obfuscation provide the individual users with possibilities
to disconnect their data traces from commercial platforms, while still being able to use
the platforms. However, the technological solutions need to be constantly updated and
renegotiated depending on changes of the concerned digital platforms.
Other forms of disconnection as resistance share that they are ‘powered’ from below,
and slow in their implementation and evolution. In contrast to data obfuscation and
detox, they are however more collective in character. Furthermore, these practices
constitute forms of complete disconnection from certain platforms or digital media
formats. Andersson (2016) explores forms of almost extensive non-participation in
digital platforms of Swedish radical left groups. He argues that the groups disengage
with digital media platforms in order to claim autonomy. Observing a sparse use of
platforms such as YouTube and Facebook to disseminate political propaganda,
Andersson argues that the media practices of radical left groups such as Anti-Fascist
Action (AFA) and the Revolutionary Front follow the principle of ‘acting without being
seen’, which collides with the aﬀordances of connectivity and visibility of social media’
(Andersson, 2016, p. 60). However, the mode of completely eschewing digital media is
rarely practiced. More common forms of resistance concern partial disconnection from
speciﬁc platforms or speciﬁc practices within certain platforms. In contrast, Gehl (2016)
provides an ethnography of a dark web social networking site within which the users
have implemented community standards that have been collectively negotiated. These
standards include completely anonymity, full exclusion of child pornography and any
commercial activities. Similarly, to strategies of obfuscation discussed above, the com-
munity aims to make use of the advantages of social networking sites, while disconnect-
ing from speciﬁc features that are prevalent in commercial platforms, such as real name
policy and commercial activities. However, in comparison to individualized forms of
data obfuscation, dark web social networking sites are often developed as collective
eﬀorts within FOSS communities.1 Hence, they rather follow the spirit of alternative
media than individualized forms of hiding data traces.
Furthermore, Anonymous practices of hacking could be situated within this realm of
disconnection as resistance. Deseriis (2013) argues that the main purpose of
Anonymous – similar to the Luddites in the 19th century – is to attack speciﬁc
machines. In the case of Anonymous, machines that restrict the access to information
or information technologies. Although Anonymous is characterised by diversity of
individual contributors and a radical openness that can be appropriated by individual
and collective action, the name Anonymous functions as collective pseudonym: indivi-
duals align around a collective that is loose, but shares certain common forms of
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subjectiﬁcation. This, Deseriis illustrates, brings diﬀerent political struggles together
discursively.
Digital disconnection as lifestyle politics
The third type of digital disconnection, refers to disconnection as performance or life
style (Portwood-Stacer, 2013) and captures practices by actors from below rather than
political elites. These are comparatively fast paced practices on the micro level and they
are highly individualized.
One of the major examples illustrating this type of disconnection are practices of
leaving certain social media platforms, for example Facebook. Deleting ones Facebook
account has gained new traction in the aftermaths of the Cambridge Analytica scandal
around misuse of Facebook data by third parties. Portwood-Stacer has earlier discussed
practices of leaving Facebook as enacting and showing a political identity on an
individual level rather than collective action. Although there are groups and initiatives
around these practices of leaving, such as the Quit Facebook Day, the act and con-
sequences are highly individualized and described as such. Portwood-Stacer (2013)
argues that this form of conspicuous non-consumption or media refusal constitutes
a performative mode of resistance and is situated in the realm of consumer empower-
ment through which certain political ideas and identities are expressed in contrast to
collective mobilizations. Karppi (2011) analyzes artistic projects that play with ideas of
non-use and disconnection from social media, e.g. the Facebook suicide machine, to
create awareness of the platform’s ubiquity and biopolitical implications.
Similarly, digital detox camps, such as Camp Grounded in California or the Villa
Insight in Sweden, are forms of disconnection as lifestyle, where the choice to partici-
pate or perform a digital detox oﬀers a way to distinguish oneself from ‘ordinary’ users
that uncritically consume digital media (Fish, 2017; Sutton, 2017). Another example of
disconnecting as lifestyle politics is the data detox programme developed by the tactical
technology collective (Tactical Technology Collective, 2017; Galer, 2017). The eight-day
guide is supposed to help you ﬁrstly realize the extent to which you leave data trace and
secondly, to detox and scale them down. Adapting the style and language of popular
detox programmes, the initiative suggests ‘you’ll be well on your way to a healthier and
more in-control digital self’ after concluding the eight steps. In contrast to the detox
camps, this initiative has, however, no commercial interest. Interventions such as the
Slow Media Manifesto2 that promotes more conscious ways of producing and consum-
ing media also emphasize individual forms of disconnection (Rauch, 2011), and often
emanate a certain nostalgia towards old/analogue media devices and formats. Hence,
the political implications of media slowness and media refusal remain in the back-
ground, and social media abstinence is conceived as lifestyle choices through individual
consumption, rather than forms of collective political action. This point is illustrated by
Fish (2017), when he compares today’s culture of digital rejection with the Free Speech
movement of the 1960s at Berkeley, California. While the latter movement protested
against the computer-readable punch cards in order to explicitly make a political point
(basically: not to be dehumanized by being reduced to mere bits of digital information),
our culture of technological rejection has lost this political resonance in favor of lifestyle
consumerism. Thus, Fish argues, today’s culture of digital rejection does not look for
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social regulation, but only strive to gain individual balance, in line with the Mindful/
New Age spirituality that pervades the Silicon Valley ethos. What is needed, Fish
concludes, is instead to politicize detox retreats, using them as venues to build collective
consciousness and mobilization eﬀorts towards building – among other things – social
regulation around social media overuse as the initiative of the Tactical Technology
Collective suggests.
Another form of disconnection as lifestyle combines slowness and individualized
ways to disconnect with a power perspective from above. We are here referring to
attempts to introduce regulations to disconnect and re-establish boundaries
between work and private life either on the governmental or corporate level that
were developed in response to mobilizations against increased digital stress espe-
cially by trade unions. France, for example, introduced legislation banning emails
after working hours. Similarly, in Germany there has even been a discourse on
regulating work-related digital stress from a policy perspective. The German Federal
Minister of Labour and Social Aﬀairs Angela Nahles in November 2016 suggested
to introduce regulations to reduce stress related to digitization. On the corporate
level, large companies like Volkswagen, Daimler and BMW have introduced strict
regulations of using communication devices for work-related tasks after working
hours (Hesselberth, 2018). Although regulations here are introduced from above
and concern larger groups, they address negative consequences related to digital
media largely as individual problems that need individualized responses (for
a similar analysis, see Hesselberth, 2018). Stress related to digital technologies in
the work context is considered in isolation. This includes the idea to regulate the
time when an individual worker is allowed to send or receive an email, rather than
tackling the issue of work-related stress on a more structural level, including issues
of job security or freelance work that enhances the precariousness of boundaries
between work and private life, which might include problems related to digital
technologies.
Discussion
The typology of disconnection activism presented here is based on a three-dimensional
matrix that systematizes and puts in relation central categories developed within social
movement studies. Bringing disconnection and social movement studies together in
that way, we aim to chart a systematic discussion of how non-use and media refusal
plays out as political practice. Typologies have the advantage to reduce complexity,
allow for comparison and the study of relationships (Baily, 1994). Furthermore, typol-
ogies potentially provide criteria to explore empirical phenomena more in-depth as they
identify similarities and diﬀerences between cases. However, there are of course proble-
matic aspects of developing typologies. Typologies often remain descriptive and rarely
provide explanations for certain phenomena. They also tend to reify theoretical
assumptions that are hardly observable empirically. In that sense, they constitute static
classiﬁcations (Baily, 1994). Although typologies are not without problems, we believe
they are helpful in developing a systematic description and inventory of practices of
media non-use that have been overlooked by research so far. The types of disconnection
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activism suggested here need however further empirical investigation and theoretical
engagement.
Conclusion
While disconnection, media refusal and technology non-use represent phenomena that are
not exclusively linked to digital media, they have gained new qualities and intensiﬁed,
following the process of deep mediatization in the digital age (Couldry & Hepp, 2017).
Practices of disconnection supposedly counter the hegemonic temporality of fast capitalism
that is especially connected to the adoption and massive spread of social media platforms.
In this article, we propose to consider push-back activism and media refusal as part of the
media repertoire of social and protest movements. In contrast to early investigations of
media practices in the context of political mobilization that largely ignored media refusal
and push-back activism, we argue that media practices in complex media ecologies
encompass both use and non-use of media. We believe that the dialogue we initiate in
this article between disconnection studies and social movement studies, and the subsequent
typology that originates from it, contributes to the literature in various ways.
First, it shows that if we want to understand social movements’ media practices
holistically, we need to consider disconnection and non-use strategies in relation to
forms of media engagement and use. As we argue, studies on digital activism have often
taken for granted the connectedness of recent movements, privileging the exploration of
highly networked and innovative case studies over the investigation of forms of con-
tention that are not geared towards technologically mediation. We have also seen that
this tendency has only been intensiﬁed by the increasing importance that big data
methodologies are acquiring within this area of research.
Our study shows that we need to re-equilibrate the balance and start to pay serious
attention to the negotiations, tactics and motives of those who decide to avoid, refuse
and withdraw from digital connection and the relation of these disconnection practices
to technology use. In an era where our attention is systematically exploited and
competed for by tech conglomerates through increasingly sophisticated techniques,
this issue acquires an even stronger political relevance. If we keep taking for granted
that contemporary activism is inherently digitally networked and continue to mainly
highlight media uses, we risk losing track of one of the most controversial aspect of
today’s activism. Namely, that the corporate platforms on which protest is largely
carried out have a deep interest in monetizing the time we devote to activism, and
this is fundamentally altering the dynamics through which we are able to build our
democracies, and imagine alternative political futures. Thus, it is precisely at activists’
continuous negotiations with social media platforms (selection, rejection, withdrawal,
refusal, etc.) that we should look to understand the ambivalences and controversies
inherent in contemporary activism.
Second, our typology is able to shed light on the diﬀerent faces and changing contexts
of media disconnection while drawing on established knowledge from social movement
studies. While in some cases disconnection is imposed and enacted with the purpose of
undermining activism, in others it is at the core of resistance from below and has a central
political role to play in the context of activism. The typology of push-back activism is the
ﬁrst attempt to systematize practices of (digital) media non-use in the context of political
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practices and contentious politics. Future studies are needed to further explore nuances of
disconnection types and investigates them in relation to hyper-connected cases.
The article makes the case against the normative implications and assumptions about
connectivity as something inherently good and desirable that have dominated research
of the nexus between media and movements. In that sense, the article contributes
a perspective that questions the dominant ideology of connectivity of the digital society
where disconnection is neglected as well as the overemphasis of hyper-connected social
movements in the digital age.
Notes
1. FOSS communities promote free and open-source software as part of their political
approach to software (Velkova, 2017).
2. The Slow Media Manifesto – a 14-point list of commandments of slowness – was published in
2010 by Benedikt Köhler, Sabria David and Jörg Blumtritt. It was shortly after discussed by
several online news outlets such as the Huﬃngton Post and Wired. Consequently, it was
broadly discussed and translated into eight languages, see http://en.slow-media.net/manifesto.
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